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THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE OF THE 
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE 
Howard E. Wallint t 
In recent years the Supreme Court has expanded the plain view ex-
ception to the warrant requirement by relaxing the prior valid intrusion 
and the inadvertency requirements. This article examines the resulting 
confusion in the state courts and identifies areas where judicial clarifica-
tion is needed. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides 
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ... , shall not 
be violated." 1 A second clause directs "no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized."2 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted these two 
provisions to mean that any search and seizure conducted without a war-
rant is per se unreasonable and that evidence acquired from a warrantless 
search and seizure is inadmissible at trial. 3 This exclusionary rule, how-
ever, has been eroded steadily by the Court's creation of various excep-
tions to the warrant requirement. Prominent among these is the plain 
view exception, first articulated by the Court in 1971 in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire. 4 Although the plain view doctrine as first formulated con-
sisted of rigid requirements, the Court no longer requires strict compli-
ance with these requirements. Consequently, the scope of the plain view 
doctrine is uncertain. This article discusses the original formulation of 
the plain view doctrine, traces the modification of its various elements, 
and discusses the confusing results generated by Maryland appellate 
courts in applying the doctrine. 
t LL.B., 1965, University of Maryland School of Law; Associate Professor of Law, 
University of Baltimore School of Law. 
t The author would like to express his appreciation to his secretary, Mrs. Martha T. 
Kahlert, for her patience and good humor. 
l. U.S. CaNST. amend. IV. 
2. /d. 
3. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See also United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696, 701 (1983); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). 
4. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). Other recognized excep-
tions to the warrant requirement include: inventory searches, South Dakota v. Op-
perman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); search incident to arrest, Chime! v. California, 395 
U.S. 752 (1969); hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); and the Car-
roll doctrine (otherwise known as the automobile exception), Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Except for a brief discussion of the Carroll doctrine, 
infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text, these exceptions are beyond the scope of 
this article. 
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II. PLAIN VIEW UNDER COOLIDGE V. NEW HAMPSHIRE 
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that a seizure of 
property occurs when the government significantly interferes with an in-
dividual's possessory interest in his property. 5 Seizure of property is per-
missible only when pursuant to either a warrant or one of the clearly 
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. 6 In Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 7 a plurality of the Court fashioned one of the principal ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement. 8 The Court held that incriminating 
evidence is admissible at trial even if obtained without a search warrant if 
three requirements are satisfied: (1) the initial police intrusion must be 
valid, 9 (2) discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent, 10 and (3) it 
must be immediately apparent to the police that the evidence is 
incriminating. 11 
The prior valid intrusion element is satisfied when the search arises 
either from a judicial warrant or is justified by one of the recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 12 The plain view doctrine, how-
5. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Place, 462 U.S. at 710 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 (1983) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
6. Place, 462 U.S. at 701. 
7. 403 u.s. 443 (1971). 
8. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,469-71 (1971). In Coolidge, pursuant to 
a warrant, police seized and searched an automobile for evidence implicating its 
owner in a murder. Because the warrant was later held to be invalid, the state 
attempted to justify its action under several different exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement, including the plain view doctrine. /d. at 464. 
9. /d. at 465-66. 
10. /d. 
II. /d. 
12. The Coolidge Court offered the following illustrations of warrantless prior valid in-
trusions. First, police may discover evidence inadvertently while in "hot pursuit" of 
a fleeing suspect. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465. The Court cited Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U.S. 294 (1967), as the prototype of the hot pursuit exception to the warrant 
requirement. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465. In Hayden, however, the warrantless hot 
pursuit search was limited to hidden felons and hidden weapons. Hayden, 387 U.S. 
at 298-300. Presumably, therefore, plain view seizures pursuant to hot pursuit war-
rantless searches are only valid when the hot pursuit search is for hidden felons or 
hidden weapons. 
A second example of warrantless prior valid intrusions is a search incident to 
arrest, as limited by Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Coolidge, 403 U.S. 
at 465. Under Chime/, the search is limited to the area within which the arrestee 
could grasp a weapon or destroy evidence. Under Coolidge, however, evidence dis-
covered by police in plain view outside of the area under the immediate control of 
the arrestee is also admissible under the plain view doctrine. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 
465 n.24. 
The final category of warrantless prior valid intrusions consists of situations in 
which police are not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently 
come across an incriminating object. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466 (citations omitted). 
See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (where co-owner of a duffel bag gave his 
consent for a police search, evidence discovered inadvertently as to the other owner 
admissible under the plain view doctrine); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 
(1968) (where departmental regulation required police to remove all valuables from 
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ever, does not in and of itself justify the intrusion. 13 It only allows the 
police to seize an item in plain view after validly entering the premises. 
Although evidence exposed to open, public observation may provide po-
lice with probable cause to obtain a warrant, 14 it does not justify a war-
rantless intrusion absent exigent circumstances that would excuse the 
procurement of a warrant. 
The inadvertency element is satisfied when the discovery of the evi-
dence is unanticipated. 15 The Court reasoned that requiring the police to 
obtain a warrant under such circumstances would be a needless incon-
venience, and perhaps dangerous to the preservation of the evidence and 
to the police themselves. 16 The plain view exception does not legitimize a 
warrantless seizure if the police have ample opportunity to obtain a valid 
warrant, and know the description and location of the evidence in 
advance. 17 
Finally, the Court in Coolidge added the requirement that it must be 
"immediately apparent" to the police that the objects seized are incrimi-
nating evidence. 18 Without this requirement, the Court feared searches 
would become "general or exploratory," in contravention of the Court's 
policy that search warrants specify the objects sought with 
particularity. 19 
The plain view doctrine frequently is confused with two related 
doctrines under which no warrant is required: the "open view" doctrine 
and the "open fields" doctrine. These two doctrines are only relevant in 
determining whether a search prohibited by the fourth amendment has 
occurred as to activate the search warrant requirement. Under the open 
view doctrine, no fourth amendment search occurs when an item is ex-
posed to the general public in open view.20 Under the open fields doc-
impounded vehicles and, pursuant to this regulation, the officer discovered an in-
criminating registration card, warrantless seizure held constitutional under the plain 
view doctrine); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (where undercover 
agent was invited into the home of an unsuspecting drug dealer, evidence discovered 
inadvertently admissible under the plain view doctrine); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 
23 (1963) (where police were inside the home to arrest the defendant and inadver-
tently discovered evidence incriminating defendant's wife during a search incident 
to that arrest, evidence admissible under the plain view doctrine). 
13. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468. As the Coolidge Court stated: "Plain view alone is never 
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." /d. 
14. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,497 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 
10, 13-15 (1948). 
15. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469. 
16. /d. at 470. 
17. /d. This inadvertency requirement prompted dissenting opinions by Justices Black 
and White. Justice Black criticized the requirement as being contrary to existing 
precedent. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 506 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice White stated 
that the inadvertency requirement was "a punitive and extravagant application of 
the exclusionary rule." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting). 
18. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466. 
19. /d. 
20. Under the open view doctrine, police observation of contraband is not a search for 
fourth amendment purposes if the incriminating evidence is exhibited to the public 
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trine, no fourth amendment search occurs when an item IS m an open 
field beyond the curtilage of the defendant's house. 21 In contrast, the 
plain view doctrine applies only after it is determined that a fourth 
amendment search has occurred and serves to excuse the seizure of the 
evidence without a warrant. 
III. SUPREME COURT'S MODIFICATION AND 
APPLICATION OF THE PRIOR VALID INTRUSION 
AND INADVERTENCY ELEMENTS 
OF PLAIN VIEW. 
As a plurality decision, Coolidge was destined to suffer modification 
by subsequent decisions. In particular, more recent cases have modified 
the prior valid intrusion and inadvertency requirements. 22 
because in such situations it is presumed that the owner does not intend to conceal 
its presence. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9 n.S (1982). The observation 
may provide the officer with probable cause to obtain a search warrant, but it does 
not give the officer the authority to enter the premises and seize the goods without a 
warrant. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 
333 u.s. 10, 13-15 (1948). 
For examples of open view observations outside the purview of fourth amend-
ment protection, see Sumdum v. State, 612 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Alaska 1980) (observa-
tion of motel room by police when motel manager opened door to check on room 
after checkout time); People v. Arroyo, 120 Cal. App. 3d 27, 31, 174 Cal. Rptr. 678, 
680 (1981) (observation of marijuana plant in defendant's patio area viewed from 
common carport area); State v. Rickard, 420 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 1982) (where 
there is no intrusion, the warrantless observation is "a legally permissive 'open 
view'"); State v. Dickerson, 313 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 1981) (observation through 
window in farmhouse door); Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 613, 292 A.2d 762, 
770 (1972) (officers' observation of dormitory room through open door). State v. 
O'Herron, 153 N.J. Super. 570, 575, 380 A.2d 728, 730 (1977) (observation from 
vantage point off defendant's property); State v. Powell, 99 N.M. 381, 385, 658 P.2d 
456, 458 (1983) (view into truck cab from public road); State v. Planz, 304 N.W.2d 
74, 80 (N.D. 1981) (view of contraband on front seat of unattended car in public 
parking lot); Cook v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 71, 73, 216 S.E.2d 48, 49 (1975) 
(observation from street into defendant's automobile). Courts have held that an 
individual has no expectation of privacy as to items in open view even when the 
police must resort to aircraft to effectuate the open view observation. See State v. 
Roode, 643 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Layne, 623 S.W.2d 629, 636 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 420, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328-
29 (1977). 
21. Under the open fields doctrine, a warrantless intrusion upon an open space outside 
the curtilage of a home is not an unreasonable search proscribed by the fourth 
amendment because open fields are not encompassed within the phrase "person, 
houses, papers and effects." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1984). 
The Court has held that an individual has no legitimate expectation that open fields 
will remain free from warrantless intrusion by police, even when he erects fences 
and posts "no trespassing" signs. /d. at 182-83. 
22. The third element, the immediately apparent requirement, is less controversial. The 
Court consistently has adopted the opinion that this requirement is satisfied only if 
the police have probable cause to believe the item observed is incriminating evi-
dence. See Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1153 (1987) (probable cause is the 
standard for immediately apparent and "to say otherwise would be to cut the 'plain 
view' doctrine loose from its theoretical and practical moorings"). 
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A. Prior Valid Intrusion 
Modification of the prior valid intrusion requirement began with 
two Supreme Court cases decided more than a decade after Coolidge. In 
Washington v. Chrisman, 23 the defendant's roommate was arrested on a 
university campus for illegal possession of alcohol.24 The roommate, 
accompanied by the arresting officer, returned to his dormitory room in 
order to get proof of identity. While standing in the open doorway, the 
officer noticed the defendant becoming nervous at the sight of the of-
ficer. 25 Seconds later the officer saw what he believed to be marijuana 
seeds and a marijuana pipe on a desk inside the room. 26 The officer en-
tered the room and confirmed that his perceptions had been accurate. 
Both the roommate and the defendant consented to a search, which 
yielded additional controlled substancesY The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington found that the warrantless entry and the seizure of the marijuana 
pipe and seeds was unlawful. Furthermore, the court excluded the in-
criminating evidence because the consent was the fruit of an illegal 
search.28 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the initial seizure of the 
marijuana seeds and pipe was valid under the plain view doctrine. 29 Be-
cause the officer had a right to accompany the arrestee into the dormi-
tory room in order to preserve the integrity of the arrest, the officer was 
permitted to confiscate contraband coming within his sight. 30 The de-
fendant argued that the plain view doctrine was inapplicable because the 
officer first chose to remain outside the room so that his observations 
were made from outside the room. The Court responded that, regardless 
of the officer's position with respect to the doorway, he had a right to 
enter the room whenever he considered it essentiaP 1 The officer's right 
to custodial control did not evaporate with his choice to hesitate in the 
doorway rather than enter the room. 32 After he observed the seeds and 
23. 455 u.s. 1 (1982). 
24. In the recital of the facts it appears the officer "stopped" the defendant's roommate. 
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 3 (1982). However, the opinion later states 
that the roommate was "under lawful arrest." /d. at 6. Earlier, the Supreme Court 
of Washington had approved the trial court's determination that the defendant had 
been arrested. State v. Chrisman, 94 Wash. 2d 711, 716, 619 P.2d 971, 974 (1980) 
(en bane), rev'd, 455 U.S. 1 (1982). 
25. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 3. 
26. /d. at 4. 
27. /d. 
28. State v. Chrisman, 94 Wash. 2d 711, 717-18, 619 P.2d 971,975 (1980), rev'd, 455 
u.s. 1 (1982). 
29. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 9. The Court succinctly described the doctrine: "The 'plain 
view' exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement permits a law en-
forcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when 
it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be." /d. at 5-6. 
30. /d. at 6-7. 
31. /d. at 9. 
32. /d. at 8-9. 
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the pipe, he had a right to act. 33 
Although Chrisman expands the scope of the plain view exception 
by permitting the plain view observation to occur before the valid intru-
sion, it is consistent with Coolidge in upholding the essentials of the prior 
valid intrusion requirement. The evidence in Chrisman was not observed 
during the course of an ongoing constitutional search, but the officer was 
vested nonetheless with the authority to conduct a warrantless entry 
prior to his observation. The Court hastened to distinguish this case 
from one where an officer, by chance, passes an open doorway to a resi-
dence and observes what he believes to be contraband inside the room. 34 
In the latter situation the officer's open view observation would not pro-
vide him with any basis for intruding without a warrant. Chrisman is 
significant, however, because it adds a new dimension to the plain view 
doctrine. Where police are vested with the authority to enter premises 
before the observation, ultimate entry is considered a prior valid intru-
sion. Thus, for the first time, the Court held that the plain view sighting 
of incriminating evidence could justify an intrusion. 35 
The Court further modified the prior valid intrusion requirement in 
Texas v. Brown. 36 In Brown, an officer asked for the defendant's driver's 
license at a routine driver's license checkpoint. The officer shined his 
flashlight into the car and saw the defendant drop a knotted opaque 
party balloon onto the seat. 37 Cognizant that narcotics frequently are 
packaged in such balloons, the officer examined the automobile's interior 
more closely and observed plastic vials, loose white powder, and an open 
bag of party balloons. 38 After the driver admitted that he did not have 
his driver's license, the officer instructed him to get out of the car. The 
officer reached into the car, removed the knotted balloon, and displayed 
it to a fellow officer. 39 The suspect was then arrested.40 Subsequent tests 
verified that the seized knotted balloon contained heroin. The Court of 
Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the plain view doctrine was inappli-
cable because the incriminating nature of the balloon was not "immedi-
33. /d. at 9. 
34. /d. at 9 n.S. 
35. Justice White dissented, disagreeing with the majority's modification of the prior 
valid intrusion requirement. /d. at 14 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued 
that neither the officer's authority to remain at the arrestee's elbow nor his authority 
to enter the room were sufficient grounds for validating the subsequent seizure. /d. 
Because entry was made with intent to remove contraband observed prior to the 
intrusion, the officer could not justify the seizure under the plain view doctrine. /d. 
36. 460 u.s. 730 (1983). 
37. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 733 (1983). 
38. /d. at 734. 
39. /d. 
40. The state court opinion suggested that the driver was arrested for failing to produce 
a current driver's license. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). The Supreme Court was unable to endorse that 
conclusion inasmuch as transcripts indicated that the defendant was arrested only 
after the balloon was seized. Brown, 460 U.S. at 734 n.2. 
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at ely apparent" to the arresting officer. 41 The United States Supreme 
Court reversed, finding that Texas had adopted an unduly restrictive in-
terpretation of the "immediately apparent" standard.42 Brown is signifi-
cant, however, not so much for its reversal on the immediately apparent 
issue as it is for its discussion of the prior valid intrusion requirement. 
Writing for the Brown plurality, Justice Rehnquist suggested that 
the Coolidge characterization of plain view as an "independent excep-
tion" to the warrant requirement was somewhat inaccurate.43 Justice 
Rehnquist suggested that the plain view doctrine is better understood as 
an extension of the officer's prior justification for access to the object 
because "plain view" merely provides grounds for the seizure of the ob-
ject. 44 In support of this contention, the Brown plurality first referred to 
the well-settled rule from Payton v. New York 45 that illegal objects found 
in public places may be seized by police without a warrant.46 The Brown 
Court acknowledged that there was a distinction between the Payton 
public place and private premises.47 Nevertheless, the plurality reasoned 
that, when an officer has "prior justification" for an intrusion into the 
premises, the owner's only remaining interest in the object is that of pos-
session and ownership, 48 the same interest an owner has in objects found 
in a public place under Payton. 
The Brown plurality found that the officer's intrusion into the car 
was valid even without a warrant based upon the "Carroll automobile 
exception."49 Under this exception, first articulated in Carroll v. United 
States, 50 probable cause alone justifies the search of a lawfully stopped 
vehicle, as well as its contents. 5 1 In Brown, the defendant's automobile 
was stopped lawfully for a traffic check, the balloon was in the officer's 
view, and the officer had probable cause to believe the car contained con-
traband. 52 Consequently, the officer's entry and search of the automobile 
was a valid intrusion upon the defendant's privacy interests. Because the 
balloon was found in plain view following a prior valid intrusion, the 
Brown plurality concluded that the evidence was admissible under the 
plain view doctrine. 
According to the Brown plurality, the "Carroll automobile excep-
tion" is justified because an individual has a reduced expectation of pri-
41. Brown, 460 U.S. at 736. 
42. /d. at 741-42. 
43. /d. at 738. 
44. /d. at 738-39. 
45. 445 u.s. 573 (1980). 
46. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). 
47. Brown, 460 U.S. at 738. 
48. /d. at 739. 
49. /d. at 741 n.6. The Brown Court actually invoked the interpretation of the Carroll 
automobile exception set forth in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
50. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
51. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
52. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742-43 (1983). 
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vacy in his automobile. Because the state's interest in preventing an 
item's disappearance always outweighs an individual's interest in the pos-
session of that item while it is in his automobile, the item will be seizable 
under the plain view doctrine as if it were publicly situated. 53 Under 
Brown, the plain view seizure doctrine extends the officer's prior justifica-
tion for seizing the object; it does not serve as an independent grounds 
for warrantless seizures. 
Unlike the classic Coolidge scenario where the discovery follows the 
valid intrusion, the incriminating evidence in both Brown and Chrisman 
was discovered before the prior valid intrusions. Brown, however, broad-
ens the Chrisman rationale by permitting intrusions that arise after the 
evidence is first discovered. The officer in Brown did not have probable 
cause to enter the car until after he saw the balloon. Once he saw the 
balloon, he had a right to enter the car under the Carroll search doctrine 
and to seize the balloon under the plain view seizure doctrine. 54 
This interpretation of the plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown is sup-
ported by the Court's analysis in two subsequent cases, Illinois v. An-
dreas55 and United States v. Jacobsen. 56 In Andreas, the Court upheld 
the warrantless search of a table that was shipped from overseas. 57 Cus-
toms officials uncovered marijuana, which was tested by narcotics agents, 
repackaged into the legs of the wooden table, and delivered to the defend-
53. This approach is suggested in a footnote in Brown on prior valid intrusion. Prior 
valid intrusion may be by a search warrant or by an exception to the warrant re-
quirement. Brown, 460 U.S. at 738 n.4. In the alternative, no justification is needed 
when property is left in a public place. /d. In analogizing these two diverse situa-
tions, the Court attempted to equate the principles governing plain view seizures 
with those governing seizures of items in public places. This analogy is somewhat 
strained, however, because, as the Court recognized, the seizure of items in public 
places does not implicate fourth amendment rights. /d. 
54. Brown appears to conform with Coolidge at least to the extent of requiring that there 
be some prior valid intrusion on the reasoning that plain view alone is insufficient to 
justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468. Although 
Justice Steven's concurrence in Brown does not conflict with this premise, one as-
pect of his plain view analysis merits further consideration. Justice Stevens states: 
An object may be considered to be 'in plain view' if it can be seized with-
out compromising any interest in privacy. Because seizure of such an ob-
ject threatens only the interest in possession, circumstances diminishing 
that interest may justify exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's usual re-
quirements. Thus, if an item has been abandoned, neither Fourth Amend-
ment interest is implicated, and neither probable cause nor a warrant is 
necessary to justify seizure. 
Brown, 460 U.S. at 748 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
If no fourth amendment interest is implicated by the removal of abandoned 
property, the action should not be considered a technical plain view seizure. No 
prior valid intrusion is required when an owner consciously has relinquished any 
privacy interest in the item. It may be, however, that Justice Stevens was referring 
to "plain view" in its ordinary, nonlegal sense. 
55. 463 u.s. 705 (1983). 
56. 466 u.s. 109 (1984). 
57. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 705, 767 (1983). 
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ant. 58 Forty-five minutes after the defendant received the table, narcot-
ics agents arrested him as he was leaving his apartment. 59 The agents 
seized the table, promptly examined it, and discovered the marijuana 
where they had left it after their initial search.60 
A majority of the Court reasoned that, just as a prior valid intrusion 
of a house minimizes a homeowner's privacy interest in items that are in 
plain view, the initial opening of the table minimized the owner's privacy 
interest in its contentsY Justice Brennan dissented, rejecting the analogy 
to the plain view s~izure doctrine. 62 He argued that there must be an 
independent justification for breaching the individual's right to security 
in his possessions, even where there is a reduced expectation ofprivacy.63 
Although the sending of a container through customs relinquishes one's 
right to keep the contents secret, 64 that act alone is not a waiver of all 
privacy interests. One retains the expectation that his possessions will 
remain undisturbed.65 Justice Brennan contended that when narcotics 
agents reopen a delivered package they violate fourth amendment protec-
tions because they have no independent reason, aside from the earlier 
administrative search, for invading the individual's privacy interests. 66 
According to Justice Brennan, the plain view seizure doctrine was em-
ployed inappropriately to justify reopening the closed container without 
a warrant.67 
Under similar facts, the Court in Jacobsen 68 held that the govern-
ment examination of the contents of a package previously opened by 
Federal Express employees did not violate any legitimate expectation of 
privacy.69 The majority reasoned that the earlier search by the Federal 
Express employee was not a government search within the meaning of 
the fourth amendment. Because the police were informed of the contents 
of the package by a third party, they obtained probable cause to search 
the package without invading a fourth amendment privacy interest. 70 
58. /d. Common carriers have a common law right to inspect packages they accept for 
shipment. See United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 399-400 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
When contraband is discovered, it is routine for common carriers to notify authori-
ties. The arrival of police to confirm the presence of contraband is not a government 
search subject to the fourth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 602 
F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979). 
59. Andreas, 463 U.S. at 767. 
60. /d. at 767-68. 
61. /d. at 771-72. With respect to the forty-five minute gap in surveillance, the Andreas 
Court held that the warrantless seizure remains valid as long as there is no substan-
tial likelihood that the contents of the container have been changed. /d. at 773. 
62. /d. at 778 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
63. /d. at 779. 
64. /d. at 776. 
65. /d. 
66. /d. at 789. 
67. /d. at 780. 
68. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
69. /d. at 126. 
70. /d. at 115. 
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Once the contents of the package were discovered by Federal Express, 
the owner no longer had an expectation of privacy. 71 
The application of the plain view doctrine in Andreas and Jacobsen 
deviates from the original plain view formula. In both cases, personal 
interests in privacy were compromised before a justified intrusion. In the 
traditional plain view scenario, the breach of privacy occurs after a justi-
fied intrusion. The individual's possessions are fully protected by the 
fourth amendment until a justified intrusion occurs. The subsequent ob-
servations of the individual's possessions are a reasonable violation of 
privacy- permissible under the fourth amendment. Andreas and Jacob-
sen equate observations made in a constitutionally protected place with 
observations made in public places. Those decisions reason that the in-
trusion on privacy is really not an intrusion because the intrusion itself 
reduces the individual's expectation of privacy. 
Although the Court allows plain view seizures based on a dimin-
ished privacy interest, an individual's expectation of privacy can be di-
minished only when there has been a justified intrusion into an 
individual's constitutionally protected domain. Therefore, prior valid in-
trusion remains an indispensable element of the plain view doctrine, re-
gardless of whether one agrees that plain view is applicable in 
"diminished privacy interest" situations. Lamentably, however, the 
Court has withdrawn from the strict, literal definition of prior valid in-
trusion. The result may well be increased criminal convictions. From 
the perspective of constitutional rights, however, the relaxation of the 
prior valid intrusion requirement is disconcerting. 
B. Inadvertency . 
The inadvertency element of the plain view doctrine, like the prior 
valid intrusion element, has become increasingly imprecise. Because the 
plain view doctrine was espoused by only a plurality of the Court in Coo-
lidge, several lower courts have regarded the Court's inadvertency dis-
cussion as dicta, 72 and some have questioned the binding effect of the 
71. It is significant that in both Andreas and Jacobsen the examination of the interiors of 
the respective containers revealed that they contained nothing but contraband. Ja-
cobsen, 466 U.S. at 120 n.l7. Any further expectations of privacy were therefore 
less than legitimate. The Court conceded that a container which can support a 
reasonable expectation of privacy may not be searched without a warrant, even on 
probable cause. /d. Presumably, therefore, a container holding both contraband 
and noncontraband could be searched only with a warrant. 
Justice White concurred with the result in Jacobsen, but argued that a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy is not diminished by an unanticipated private search. /d. 
at 132-33 (White, J., concurring). He also disagreed with the majority's assertion 
that the criterion for privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as they 
existed at the time the invasion occurred. /d. at 132. 
72. See North v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 307-08, 502 P.2d 
1305, 1308-09, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 836-37 (1972); State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 
712, 518 P.2d 969, 974 (1974); State v. King, 191 N.W.2d 650, 655 (Iowa), cert. 
denied, 406 U.S. 908 (1971); State v. Mitchell, 300 N.C. 305, 310-11, 266 S.E.2d 
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opinion. 73 Other courts have latched onto language in the opinion that 
appears to exclude contraband, stolen goods, and dangerous items from 
the inadvertency requirement. 74 
Although most courts have accepted the inadvertency limitation on 
a plain view seizure, 75 the degree of expectation necessary to make a po-
605, 609 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1085 (1981). The Supreme Court oflowa in 
King mistakenly refers to the Coolidge plurality opinion as a "minority" opinion. 
King, 191 N.W.2d at 655. 
73. See United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1101 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 895 (1974); United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 413 U.S. 931 (1974). One court has suggested that although inadvertence 
may not be required for conventional seizures, it may be indispensable in an elec-
tronic surveillance context because those invasions are of a more insidious nature. 
United States v. Pine, 473 F. Supp. 349, 358 (D. Md. 1978). 
74. The plurality opinion states: 
[T]o extend the scope of such an intrusion to the seizure of objects - not 
contraband nor stolen nor dangerous in themselves - which the police 
know in advance they will find in plain view and intend to seize, would fly 
in the face of the basic rule that no amount of probable cause can justify a 
warrantless seizure. 
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 472 ("this is not a case 
involving contraband or stolen good or objects dangerous in themselves") (footnotes 
omitted). 
Justice White dissented, criticizing the "confusing and unworkable" distinction 
between contraband and mere evidence. /d. at 519 (White, J., dissenting). For 
cases interpreting Coolidge as inapplicable to contraband, see United States v. 
Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 951-52 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 
1335, 1346 (4th Cir. 1981 ); United States v. Gorman, 637 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 
1981); United States v. Vargas, 621 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 854 
(1980); United States v. Cutts, 535 F.2d 1083, 1084 (8th Cir. 1976); State v. Slade, 
116 N.H. 436, 439, 362 A.2d 194, 196 (1976). 
In both Bellina and Vargas, the courts relied on the observation made in Lo-Ji 
Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 n.5 (1979), that "contraband may be 
seized without a warrant under the 'plain view' doctrine." Although the statement 
is correct, it does not support the bald conclusion that inadvertency is not a require-
ment when contraband is involved. On the contrary, the Lo-Ji decision made it 
clear that prior to the intrusion in that case, there was insufficient probable cause to 
seize the pornographic contraband. !d. at 325. Because a search warrant could not 
have been obtained, the seizure of contraband under the circumstances was, in fact, 
inadvertent. 
One prominent author complains that no explanation was offered for excluding 
contraband, and stolen and dangerous goods from the inadvertency limitation; nor 
is an explanation readily apparent. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.4(K), at 
139-40 (1985). In Vargas, the Second Circuit suggested that inadvertence is not 
required for a plain view seizure of contraband because under federal law, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 88l(a)(l)-(3), there is no property right in controlled substances. Vargas, 621 
F.2d at 56. This explanation is unappealing because expectations of privacy ordina-
rily are not defined by property interests. Some support for that concept may be 
found, however, in more recent Supreme Court decisions that consider privacy in-
terests in contraband less than legitimate. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 
109, 123 (1984). 
75. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983); United States v. Liberti, 616 
F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980); State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 
25, 35, 397 A.2d 1062, 1066 (1979). See also LAFAVE, supra note 74, § 3.4(K). 
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lice discovery inadvertent remains elusive.76 The possibility that incrimi-
nating items will be discovered on the premises does not invalidate an 
otherwise valid plain view seizure.77 On the other hand, where there is 
probable cause to believe certain evidence will be found, many courts 
have overturned warrantless seizures for lack of inadvertence. 78 Inas-
much as a warrant could have been obtained, evidence from a warrant-
less seizure is not admissible under the plain view doctrine. 
In other jurisdictions, however, probable cause alone is not enough 
to invalidate a plain view seizure. Even in situations where the officers 
could have obtained a warrant, discovery can be deemed inadvertent if 
the officers acted innocently and the procedure was not a mere subterfuge 
to the warrant requirement. 79 Courts using this good faith standard con-
sider the inadvertency requirement as a way of preventing police from 
obtaining a warrant "in bad faith" or using plain view to "evade the 
warrant requirement. " 80 If a warrant is sought in good faith, police 
76. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 244 (1971). 
77. See Liberti, 616 F.2d at 37; People v. Stoppel, 637 P.2d 384, 389-91 (Colo. 1981); 
State v. Pepe, 176 Conn. 75, 79-80, 405 A.2d 51, 53-54 (1978); State v. McColgan, 
631 S.W.2d 151, 155 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). 
78. See United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cir. 1979); State v. Howard, 
448 So. 2d 713, 718 (La. App. 1984); Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319, 326 
n.6, 331 n.9, 409 N.E. 2d 719, 724 n.6, 727 n.9 (1980); Commonwealth v. Casuccio, 
308 Pa. Super. 450, 469-70, 454 A.2d 621, 630-31 (1982). 
If the inadvertency limitation on the plain view doctrine is to make any sense at 
all, it must require that a discovery of objects not named in the search warrant 
always be inadvertent. No attention should be given to the hopes or expectations of 
the police. LAFAVE, supra note 74, § 3.4(K), at 139-40. 
One jurist has aptly observed that "traditional roles on the issue of probable 
cause" are oddly reversed under these circumstances because the defendant will 
urge and the state disclaim the presence of probable cause. Liberti, 616 F.2d at 38 
(Newman, J., concurring). 
79. United States v. Johnson, 707 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Wright, 641 F.2d 602, 605-06 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021 (1981). In both 
cases federal agents, in good faith, accompanied state officers during valid state 
searches and seizures of drugs. Although in both cases, the Eighth Circuit conceded 
that the federal agents could have obtained warrants for the items seized, the plain 
view exception was held applicable. 
In State v. Oliver, 341 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1983), the inadvertency requirement 
was met where police had probable cause to include the magazines seized in their 
application for a search warrant. The court reasoned there was no basis for finding 
the magazines were omitted intentionally from the search warrant. The record had 
established that the magazines were omitted from the warrant application due to an 
oversight, and police were not looking for them. /d. at 746. 
Jurisdictions viewing inadvertency as a means of deterring subterfuge may read 
Coolidge as implying that the officers in Coolidge did not act in good faith. That 
premise could be based on United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), in which the 
Court recognized that a good faith exception to the warrant requirement could not 
be invoked by police "where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial 
role." /d. at 923. It could be argued that the officers in Coolidge should have real-
ized that the warrant issued by a non-neutral magistrate was invalid and that the 
ensuing entry was a subterfuge to the warrant requirement. 
80. See Johnson, 707 F.2d at 321; Wright, 641 F.2d at 605-06; Oliver, 341 N.W.2d at 
746. 
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knowledge of what evidence might be discovered should not bar a plain 
view seizure. 81 
Although the good faith standard appears appropriate, the Coolidge 
opinion does not support it. The seizure in Coolidge was authorized by a 
warrant. 82 The warrant was invalidated, however, because it was issued 
by a non-neutral magistrate.83 In an attempt to bring the search and 
seizure of the defendant's automobile under an exception to the warrant 
requirement, the prosecution argued that the plain view doctrine was ap-
plicable. The Court disagreed because the discovery of the automobile 
was not inadvertent inasmuch as the automobile and other evidence 
seized were specifically listed in the warrant. 84 
In jurisdictions permitting plain view seizures where the seized evi-
dence was not listed in the warrant due to an oversight and police were 
not expecting to remove the items, discovery of the evidence is consid-
ered inadvertent. This rationale appears to penalize police for their at-
tempts to comply with the warrant requirement. In addition to 
producing that rather curious anomaly, the requirement of inadvertency 
is difficult to apply. Courts relying on a good faith criterion must ex-
amine the subjective intent of intruding officers. This determination en-
tails inquiry into whether the failure to list the evidence was deliberate or 
accidental, whether the invasion was undertaken with the expectation 
that these objects would be seized, and whether all the officers were oper-
ating under the same misapprehension. A more practical guide for deter-
mining whether seizures are inadvertent is the familiar and workable 
probable cause standard. 
Controversy over the inadvertency requirement may hinge on a par-
ticular court's reading of the Coolidge plain view analysis. In Coolidge, 
the Court reasoned that if a warrant fails to mention a particular object, 
but police know the object's location and intend to seize it, there is a 
violation of the constitutional requirement that a warrant particularly 
describe the things to be seized. 85 Some jurisdictions may interpret 
knowledge to mean that police must have known the exact location of a 
particular item. Under those circumstances, discovery of the item would 
not be inadvertent. 86 
Other jurisdictons consider two elements to determine whether 
there was "a planned warrantless seizure": (1) knowledge of the item's 
location, and (2) intent to seize the item. 87 Under this interpretaton, 
even if there is probable cause to obtain a warrant, removal of that object 
81. See supra note 80. Presumaby all jurisdictions would agree that no plain view 
seizure could be made where the warrant naming the seized article is later declared 
invalid. See State v. Westfall, 446 So. 2d 1292, 1304 (La. App. 1984). 
82. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U.S. 443, 447 (1971). 
83. Id. at 453. 
84. Id. at 472-73. 
85. Id. at 471. 
86. Id. at 472. 
87. Id. at 471 n.27. 
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may be inadvertent if the invasion is not for the purpose of seizing a 
particular object. 
Since Coolidge, Supreme Court decisions have offered no standard 
for determining whether a seizure is inadvertent. Additionally, the 
Court has not addressed the lingering doubts over whether inadvertency 
is an indispensable element of the plain view doctrine. In Texas v. 
Brown, 88 Justice Rehnquist noted that several lower court decisions 
questioned the validity of the inadvertency requirement89 and Justice 
White wrote. a separate opinion specifically rejecting inadvertency as a 
requirement of plain view seizures.90 Justice Powell and Justice Black" 
mun, on the other hand, saw no reason to cast doubt on the Coolidge 
articulation of the plain view exception.91 The three remaining Justices 
offered no comment on the inadvertency requirement. 92 
In Brown, the officer's view of contraband preceded his right under 
the Carroll doctrine to enter and search the automobile's interior. Ordi-
narily, when police learn that evidence is located in a constitutionally 
protected area, a warrant must be obtained prior to entry. Under the 
Brown rationale, however, when police unexpectedly see evidence under 
circumstances in which applying for a warrant might lead to the loss of 
that evidence, a warrantless search and seizure is permissible. More spe-
cifically, if the warrantless invasion based on an inadverent observation 
would satisfy the other requirements of the plain view doctrine, the inva-
sion is valid. 93 Had the officer expected to find the drugs before he 
stopped the car, the failure to obtain a warrant could not be excused. In 
Brown, the inconvenience of obtaining a warrant prior to the intrusion 
fulfilled the requirement that the discovery be inadvertent. 
The Brown decision is flawed, however, because it fails to recognize 
88. 460 u.s. 730 (1983). 
89. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 n.8 (1983). 
90. /d. at 744 (White, J., concurring). 
91. /d. at 746 (Powell, J., concurring). The fact that these two Justices appear to accept 
the plain view doctrine as developed in Coolidge invalidates the justice-counting 
theory proposed by the Fourth Circuit. United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 
1101 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974). In Bradshaw, the court theo-
rized that inadvertency was not required because three members of the Court dis-
agreed with the inadvertency requirement (Burger, White and Blackmun) and two 
new members shared the same view (Rehnquist and Powell); thus a Court majority 
repudiating inadvertency was present. The theory is without foundation because 
neither Justice Powell nor Justice Blackmun challenged the view of the Coolidge 
plurality. 
92. It is interesting to note that, although contraband was seized in Texas v. Brown, the 
Court did not refer to the language in Coolidge that seemingly exempts contraband 
from the inadvertency requirement. Jurisdictions adopting the view that contraband 
need not be discovered inadvertently have not recognized the implicit rejection of 
that interpretation in Texas v. Brown. See United States v. Hultgren, 713 F.2d 79, 
88-89 (5th Cir. 1983); State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530,547,482 A.2d 300, 310, cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1984); State v. Hobson, 8 Conn. App. 13, 18 n.7, 511 A.2d 
348, 351 n.7 (1986); People v. Boyd, 123 Misc. 2d 634, 640,474 N.Y.S.2d 661, 667 
(1984); see also State v. Cote, 126 N.H. 514, 527, 493 A.2d 1170, 1179 (1985). 
93. Cf Brown, 460 U.S. at 743-44. 
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that the evidence was not found inadvertently inasmuch as the invasion 
was undertaken for the very purpose of seizing that evidence. Although 
the seizure in Brown may well have been justified under the Carroll auto-
mobile exception, the lack of inadvertency takes the seizure outside the 
parameters of the original plain view formula. Under Brown, the 
seizures would be permissible under the plain view doctrine as long as the 
circumstances prior to the intrusion make obtaining a warrant 
impractical. 
What emerges from Brown is a disturbing modification of the inad-
vertency requirement. In the classic plain view scenario depicted in Coo-
lidge, a prior valid intrusion must precede the inadvertent discovery of 
evidence. Chrisman extends Coolidge to situations where the inadvertent 
discovery is made prior to the invasion, but after the officer was vested 
with the authority to make an invasion. Brown suggests that the inadver-
tency requirement is satisfied simply if it would be inconvenient to obtain 
a warrant.94 
IV. MARYLAND APPLICATION OF THE PRIOR VALID 
INTRUSION AND INADVERTENCY 
REQUIREMENTS 
A. Prior Valid Intrusion 
The confusion generated by the United States Supreme Court as to 
the precise nature of the prior valid intrusion requirement has been com-
plicated further in Maryland by inconsistent or incomplete appellate de-
cisions. Although the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has 
explained that plain view seizures are valid only if they are preceded by a 
prior valid intrusion,95 the court confused the plain view and open view 
doctrines.96 Moreover, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has failed to 
94. Because, under Brown, an exigency arising prior to invasion satisfies the inadver-
tency requirement, Chrisman may be interpreted similarly. Obviously, it would have 
been inconvenient for the officer in Chrisman who spotted contraband inside the 
arrestee's dormitory room to obtain a warrant. Therefore, plain view is applicable 
when an unanticipated discovery has been preceded by the right to intrude. As a 
practical matter, this theory might validate plain view seizures which otherwise 
would fail to satisfy Brown. For example, police arrive at a suspect's home armed 
with a search warrant for Item A. Before entering or making their presence known, 
the police spot the equally incriminating Item B displayed in the window. Under 
Brown, obtaining a warrant for Item B would be inconvenient. Yet the discovery of 
Item B is anticipated and therefore inadmissible under plain view. Pursuant to Chr-
isman, however, the discovery of Item B would be inadvertent for purposes of plain 
view because Item B was observed after the police were already authorized to enter 
the premises pursuant to the warrant for Item A. Courts have yet to consider the 
legality of seizures under these circumstances. 
95. Dent v. State, 33 Md. App. 547, 557, 365 A.2d 57, 63 (1976); Floyd v. State, 24 Md. 
App. 363, 366, 330 A.2d 677, 679, cert. denied, 275 Md. 748 (1975); Neam v. State, 
14 Md. App. 180, 185, 286 A.2d 540, 543 (1972). 
96. Hutchinson v. State, 38 Md. App. 160, 380 A.2d 232 (1977), illustrates the confu-
sion of the plain view and open view doctrines by the Court of Special Appeals of 
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discuss the prior valid intrusion requirement altogether, despite being 
provided with the opportunity to do so in Liichow v. State. 97 
In Liichow, the defendant was told by a trailer park owner and by 
the police to leave a trailer park because of his involvement in several 
disturbances. 98 As the defendant was transferring his belongings into a 
waiting car, an officer observed many white, dime-sized tablets at the 
bottom of a large plastic bag.99 The bag was seized and a subsequent 
search revealed that the tablets were a controlled dangerous substance. 100 
The defendant was convicted for the possession of narcotics but the court 
of appeals reversed the conviction because the warrantless search was 
unconstitutional. 101 The court held that the search could not be justified 
under the plain view exception 102 because pharmaceutical companies 
manufacture many white tablets that are not contraband and it could not 
have been immediately apparent to the officer that the tablets were 
Maryland. In Hutchinson, a police officer stopped a car driven by an individual 
whom the officer believed had just committed a felony. As he was arresting the 
suspect, the officer observed a handgun and bullets in the back seat of the car. The 
items were not seized until the car was at an impoundment lot. The court upheld 
the search of the car and seizure of evidence on two separate grounds. First, the 
Hutchinson court held that the exigent circumstances at the time of arrest gave the 
officer probable cause to believe the car contained an instrumentality of the crime. 
/d. at 171, 380 A.2d at 238. In offering a second ground on which to justify its 
holding, however, the court confused the open view and plain view doctrines. The 
court attempted to invoke the plain view doctrine, under which a search incident to 
the arrest would serve as the prior valid intrusion. Instead, the court quoted Sweet-
ing v. State, 5 Md. App. 623, 627-28, 249 A.2d 195, 198 (1969), a pre-Coolidge 
Maryland case which propounds the open view doctrine. 
Similar confusion occurs in Roop v. State, l3 Md. App. 251, 283 A.2d 198 
(1971). In Roop, police stopped a car that was trying to evade them. As an officer 
approached, he observed a quantity of stereo equipment in the car. The occupants 
of the car were arrested for housebreaking. The car was searched and evidence was 
seized after the car was brought to the station. The court of special appeals held the 
arrest and subsequent search and seizure unconstitutional because the police lacked 
the probable cause belief that the defendants committed a felony. In attempting to 
analyze the case under the plain view doctrine, the court mistakenly referred to a 
classic open view observation where, without a search, an officer sees objects in plain 
view within a motor vehicle of such a nature as to give him probable cause to believe 
that the vehicle harbors that which is subject to seizure- whether it be contraband 
or the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidences of crime. /d. at 260, 283 A.2d at 203. 
97. 288 Md. 502, 419 A.2d 1041 (1980). 
98. Liichow v. State, 288 Md. 502, 504, 419 A.2d 1041, 1042 (1980). 
99. /d. at 504-05, 419 A.2d at 1042-43. 
100. /d. at 505-06, 419 A.2d at 1043-44. 
101. /d. at 509, 419 A.2d at 1045. 
102. /d. at 513, 419 A.2d at 1047. The court also excluded the evidence in reliance on 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). Liichow v. State, 288 Md. 502, 510-13, 
419 A.2d 1041, 1046-4 7 ( 1980). In Sanders, the Supreme Court held that a suitcase 
could be seized from an automobile if the police had probable cause to believe the 
suitcase contained contraband, but that the suitcase could be searched only after 
obtaining a warrant. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 767. On this authority, the Liichow court 
held that the officer was permitted to seize the bag, but that he was prohibited from 
searching it without a warrant because of the defendant's reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the bag. Liichow, 288 Md. at 512, 419 A.2d at 1046. 
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contraband. 103 
Although the Liichow court acknowledged the requirements of the 
plain view doctrine by quoting an excerpt from Coolidge, 104the court 
never discussed the prior valid intrusion element. The dissent asserted, 
however, that the prior valid intrusion requirement was "plainly satis-
fied" because the officer was lawfully on the premises in the course of his 
police duties. 105 This position is erroneous, however, because the obser-
vation of the tablets constituted merely an open view observation. A le-
gitimate right to see the contents of an opened bag is not a prior valid 
intrusion unless there is some further legal authority to invade the recep-
tacle's interior. Thus, neither the Liichow majority nor the dissent pro-
vides any valid constitutional basis for the officer's warrantless search of 
the seized plastic bag. 106 
B. Inadvertency 
Maryland, in conformity with the majority view, has accepted the 
inadvertency requirement as an indispensable element of the plain view 
exception. 107 Application of the inadvertency requirement by Maryland 
courts, however, is both confusing and inconsistent. 
103. The dissent argued that the tablets were seized properly under the plain view doc-
trine because the officer had probable cause to believe the tablets were a controlled 
dangerous substance. Liichow, 288 Md. at 514-15, 419 A.2d at 1047-48. Indeed, in 
Brown, decided three years after Liichow, the Supreme Court cautioned against in-
terpreting "immediately apparent" to mean the officer must be possessed of "near 
certainty" as to the seizable nature of the items. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 
(1983). Moreover, in the recent case of Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987), 
the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that probable cause was sufficient to satisfy 
the immediately apparent requirement. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153. 
At least one state has construed the immediately apparent requirement under 
its state constitution more strictly than the Supreme Court construes the require-
ment. See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 235, 471 A.2d 347, 352-54 (1983). The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland has taken the position that Article 26 of the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights must be read in conjunction with the fourth amendment. 
Liichow, 288 Md. at 509 n. I, 419 A.2d at 1044-45 n.l. Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court's perception of the "immediately apparent" requirement probably would be 
accepted by the court of appeals in interpreting the Maryland constitution. 
104. /d. at 513, 419 A.2d at 1047 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 
466 (1971)). 
105. Liichow, 288 Md. at 519, 419 A.2d at 1050. 
106. Even under the Supreme Court view in Andreas and Jacobsen that privacy interests 
in closed containers may be lost because of prior inspections, the officer's fortuitous 
glimpse into the bag did not eliminate the defendant's further legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy in his possessions. Liichow might be decided differently today based 
on United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Under Ross, an officer with a prob-
able cause belief that contraband is hidden in an automobile can search the entire 
vehicle and its contents. Thus, in a situation similar to Liichow, if the bag was 
already in the vehicle, the officer could search the car and its contents in search of 
contraband and seize the evidence under the plain view doctrine. 
107. State v. Boone, 284 Md. I, 10, 393 A.2d 1361, 1366 (1978); State v. Wilson, 279 Md. 
189, 195, 367 A.2d 1223, 1227-28 (1977); Smith v. State, 33 Md. App. 407, 410-11, 
365 A.2d 53, 55-56 (1976). 
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In 1972, the court of special appeals determined in Brown v. State 108 
that the inadvertency requirement should be applied narrowly where po-
lice have probable cause to obtain a search warrant. 109 This approach 
logically limits plain view seizures to evidence for which a warrant could 
not be obtained. Cases following Brown, however, appear to apply a dif-
ferent standard. 
In Waine v. State, 110 for example, the police obtained a warrant to 
search a murder suspect's residence, but seized evidence that was not 
listed in the warrant. 111 The court condoned seizure of the unlisted items 
because the police had plain view of the unlisted items. 112 Because the 
police had prior probable cause to believe the unlisted items would be 
discovered during the search, however, the items could have been speci-
fied in the warrant. Therefore, the court's reliance on plain view is mis-
placed; the inadvertency requirement bars warrantless seizures in 
circumstances where a warrant could have been obtained. Given the of-
ficers' probable cause belief that the evidence would be discovered among 
the suspect's possessions, the discovery was anticipated. The court in 
Waine apparently considered the inadvertency requirement to be merely 
a means of preventing conscious subterfuge of the warrant requirement. 
The court did not consider the requirement as excluding evidence that 
should have been named in the warrant but was mistakenly omitted. 113 
One year later, the court of special appeals reached a similar result 
in Briscoe v. State. 114 In Briscoe, the police seized a shotgun that was not 
listed in the warrant authorizing the search of a rape suspect's resi-
dence.115 The court held that the shotgun fell within the general lan-
guage of the warrant, which provided for the seizure of "all evidence and 
paraphenalia found which may be in connection with purported viola-
tions of the aforementioned crimes statutes." 116 On alternative grounds, 
the court found the warrantless seizure valid under the plain view excep-
tion. 117 The court found the discovery of the shotgun inadvertent even 
108. Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 292 A.2d 762 (1972). 
109. /d. at 608 n.39, 292 A.2d at 776 n.39 (quoting The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 3, 250 (1971)). The Brown court's holding, that the plain view 
doctrine did not apply, was based not upon the inadvertency requirement, but upon 
the lack of prior valid intrusion. /d. at 612-13, 292 A.2d at 778. 
110. 37 Md. App. 222, 377 A.2d 509 (1977). 
Ill. Waine v. State, 37 Md. App. 222, 237, 377 A.2d 509, 519 (1977). 
112. /d. at 238, 377 A.2d at 519. 
113. The opinion implies that the omission of the unlisted items from the warrant was an 
oversight, not deliberate. 
114. 40 Md. App. 120, 388 A.2d 153, cert. denied, 283 Md. 730 (1978). 
115. Briscoe v. State, 40 Md. App. 120, 130, 388 A.2d 153, 159, cert. denied, 283 Md. 
730 (1978). 
116. /d. A supporting affidavit specifically stated that a shotgun had been used during 
the robbery. /d. at 124, 388 A.2d at 156. 
117. The court summarized the plain view requirements: 
For the warrantless seizure to be constitutionally valid under the plain 
view doctrine, however, it must be established that the police had prior 
justification for an intrusion into the area searched, that the police inad-
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though it could have been listed in the search warrant because the omis-
sion was a good faith error. 118 The court invoked the plain view excep-
tion presumably because it believed inadvertency is required only for the 
purpose of deterring pretextual intrusions. Although that position is 
consistent with Waine, it is inconsistent with Brown. 
In Norwood v. State, 119 the court of special appeals resumed its ad-
herence to the view expressed in Brown. In Norwood, a warrant was 
issued for the seizure of certain evidence from a suspected rapist's resi-
dence. During the search, officers seized several keys not mentioned in 
the warrant. The suspect was believed to have entered the victim's apart-
ment with a pass key. The defendant claimed that the discovery of the 
keys was anticipated and therefore not inadvertent. 120 The court charac-
terized the argument as "a catch 22" situation: 
The short answer to this is simply that appellant confuses his 
probable causes. Because there had been no signs of forced en-
try into the locked apartment, the officer had "probable cause" 
to believe that a pass key afforded the unlawful entry and 
would thus be evidence associated with the crime. His expres-
sion of a belief that the key or keys would be in Howard's 
apartment may have been a reasonable suspicion based upon 
other evidence of Howard's culpability, but it fell short of con-
stituting "probable cause" to obtain a warrant to search for it 
(or them). When upon lawful entry under the warrant the keys 
appeared in plain view they were, in light of the foregoing cir-
cumstances, "probably" those used to gain entrance and were 
therefore properly seized. 121 
Thus, under Norwood, the test for inadvertency is whether probable 
cause exists prior to entry. 122 Under either Waine or Briscoe, however, 
vertently came across the item seized, and that it was 'immediately appar-
ent' to the police that the item seized was evidence. 
/d. at 131, 388 A.2d at 159-160 (quoting Smith v. State, 33 Md. App. 407,410, 365 
A.2d 53, 55 (1976)). 
118. Where a robbery victim has not informed authorities of every item taken from him, 
plain view may validate the seizure of an unlisted stolen object. People v. Boyd, 123 
Misc. 2d 634,640,474 N.Y.S.2d 661, 667 (1984). In that situation, police discovery 
is unexpected. In Briscoe, however, police knew the suspect used a shotgun in the 
commission of the crime. 
119. 55 Md. App. 503, 462 A.2d 93 (1983). 
120. Norwood v. State, 55 Md. App. 503, 507-09, 462 A.2d 93, 96 (1983). 
121. /d. at 509, 462 A.2d at 96. 
122. The court's conclusion that the keys could not have been named in the warrant 
because the police lacked the probable cause belief that the keys would be found at 
the defendant's residence is startling. Assuming there was probable cause to believe 
the suspect entered the victim's apartment with a pass key, it is logical to believe 
that a pass key might be secreted in the suspect's home. If the use of a pass key 
were pure speculation, there would have been no basis for associating the key with 
criminal conduct. Thus, in upholding the seizure, the court was compelled to reach 
the strained conclusion that although the police had probable cause to believe a 
1987] The Plain View Doctrine 285 
the discovery of the keys would have been inadvertent because there was 
no evidence of bad faith on the part of the police. 
The uncertainty created by these conflicting decisions is apparent in 
the dissenting opinion in the subsequent case of Ross v. State. 123 In Ross, 
a search warrant called for the seizure of "obscene, erotic and porno-
graphic material." 124 The majority held that the seizure of an obscene 
videotape not listed in the warrant did not fall within the plain view ex-
ception because the officers lacked a reasonable belief that the videotape 
was evidence of a crime. 125 The dissent argued that the videotape was 
within the scope of the warrant's description and, even if it were not, the 
seizure was permissible under the plain view doctrine. 126 Under Nor-
wood, discovery is anticipated if there is probable cause to include the 
object in a warrant. The Ross dissent appears to reject the Norwood 
probable cause standard for inadvertency in favor of the Waine-Briscoe 
interpretation of inadvertency under which a discovery is inadvertent un-
less there is evidence of bad faith or an attempt to subvert the warrant 
requirement. It is still not resolved, however, whether the Norwood prob-
able cause approach or the Waine-Briscoe good faith approach is the law 
in Maryland. Of the two positions, the Norwood approach is preferable 
because, as an objective approach, it is more workable and logical. The 
evaluation of inadvertency on the basis of good faith is nebulous and 
impractical. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite a significant shift in the theoretical underpinnings of the 
plain view doctrine and significant modification of the original principles 
articulated in Coolidge, the doctrine provides a viable basis for warrant-
less seizures. Where police officers discover incriminating evidence inad-
vertently while properly on the premises, the plain view doctrine 
appropriately allows such evidence to be admitted at trial. In such situa-
tions, the requirement of a warrant would not serve to deter wrongful 
police activity; rather it would serve to exclude relevent evidence that is 
fortuitously acquired. 
Unfortunately, however, several key issues concerning the nature 
and extent of the plain view doctrine remain unresolved. Courts, includ-
ing those in Maryland, have misinterpreted the prior valid intrusion re-
quirement by failing to recognize that entry into areas supporting an 
interest in privacy, such as houses, cars, or containers, may not be based 
only upon an open view. An independent legitimate basis for a search 
must precede any plain view seizure. Additionally, courts in Maryland 
master key was used, they had no probable cause to believe the keys were in the 
suspect's residence. 
123. 59 Md. App. 251, 475 A.2d 481 (1984). 
124. Ross v. State, 59 Md. App. 251, 256, 475 A.2d 481, 483 (1984). 
125. /d. at 261-62, 475 A.2d at 486-87. 
126. Jd. at 273, 475 A.2d at 492 (Garrity, J., dissenting). 
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and elsewhere have displayed a lack of consistency in applying the inad-
vertency requirement. Courts have failed to clarify whether discovery 
before the intrusion satisfies the inadvertency requirement, whether lack 
of probable cause is required for inadvertency, or whether good faith 
omissions from a warrant are sufficient. Until the prior valid intrusion 
requirement is honored and the parameters of inadvertence clearly 
drawn, the scope of the plain view doctrine will remain uncertain. 
